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I examine optimal export polic~~ using a two-period model of oligopolistic in-
ternational competition ~cith switching costs. A switching costs model captures
the idea that market share in one period affects profits and w~elfare in future peri-
ods. If consumers are ímpatient, firms and gocernments are patient and switching
costs are si~nificant then governments subsidize first period exports and tax sec-
ond period exports, otherwise gocernments tax exports in both periods. Although
go~ernments ma~. subsidize first period exports, each countr}~ is made worse off b}~
the fact that both countries subsidize. In addition, firms may 'dump' (price below
marginal cost ) under conditions similar to those required for export subsidies.
'CentER for Economic Research, P.O. Box 90153. 5000 LE Tilburg, The `e[herlands. I thank
Helmut Bester. Jim Cassing, Esther Gal-Or. Jim Harrigan, Steve Husted, Liu 3Ciaoxi, Jack Ochs, Rodrigo
Peruga. Bob Sinclair. Lynn Smith and tw.o anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.




The t~.S. International Trade Commission determined that in 1990 twenty-eight countries
subsidized some of their exports to the C-.S.' The subsidized goods w~ere in many stages
of fabrication and included steel products, textiles, leather products and agricultural
products. The fact that many- go~~ernments subsidize exports contradicts the perfectly
competiti~~e model of international trade w~hich say~s that, in general, export subsidies
reduce home countn~ ~~.elfare. ~t'hy- then do many governments choose to subsidize ex-
ports:' One ans~~er is that these go~.ernments do not maximize k.elfare at all and that
political interest groups influence the decision to subsidize exports. ~~'hile this pro~-ides
one explanaticn of ti.~h~ eorernments subsidize exports, it is not a complete answer: it
is unrealistic to belie~-e that go~-ernments can completel~- ignore taxpay-er and consumer
interests. .-~nother ans~ti~er is that perfect competition is not a good characterization of
ho~~. these industries operate and that economists should examine imperfectly. compet-
iti~.e models of international trade. This is the ~-iek- that I and se~-eral other authors
take.2
Brander and Spencer (19~.~) ~cere the first to use an oligopoly model to explain export
subsidies. They- used a one period duopol}- trade model k-here go~.ernments first choose
a tax or subsid~~ policy~ and then firms compete in output. The~- found that each go~~ern-
ment~s optimal policy. is to subsidize exports. Each exporting go~~ernment subsidizes in
order to pro~~ide the domestic firm with the ability- to commit to produce more output
(e.g. in a 5tackelberg Cournot game, the firm with the commitment ability~ produces a
greater le~-el of output than it k~ould in a simultaneous mo~~e game). An export subsidy
]o~ti~ers the firm~s percei~-ed marginal cost and hence allow.s the firm to credibly produce
more output.
L-sing a similar frame~~~ork. Eaton and Grossman (19S6) examined a one period
Bertrand duopol}- trade model. The}~ find that optimal policy~ in this case is an expoct
tax. An export tax increases the firm's perceived marginal cost so that the exporting
'See L'.S.LT.C. (1991)
~See Bagw~ell ( 1991). Brander and Spencer ( 1985). Carmichael (1987), Eaton and Grossman ( 1986),
Gruenspecht ( 19886) and ~ear~ ( 1991).
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firms can conunit to charging a higher price.
`fore recentl}~, Carmichael (198ï) and Gruenspecht (1988b) used a one period
Bertrand trade model to show that w.hen governments move after firms, governments
~ will subsidize exports. `eary- (1991), how.ever, showed that if governments have the abil-
it}~ to decide w.hether to be the first mover or the second mover, they prefer move first
and tax exports.
Since a theor} of export subsidies should be robust to changes in the nature of com-
petition, these findings cast doubt on the idea that imperfect competition alone can
explain w hy~ governments subsidize exports. The main limitation of these earlier studies
is that the}. only- consider export policies in a one period modeL Of course, a multi-
period extension is interesting onl}- if there is an inter-temporal link between periods. It
is clear, how~e~~er, that in many- cases such a link does exist. One possibility is that cur-
rent market share affects the future profitability of a firm. The Japanese are frequently
accused b~ L-.S. politicians and the press of competing unfairly for L~.S. market share
Imicro-chips are a recent example). If there is any truth to these claims then it must be
that market share affects profitabilit}- in future periods and thus affects optimal trade
policies. Existing w.ork that examines international trade w-hen market share matters
are papers b}~ Baldw-in and I~rugman (1989), Dick (1991). Froot and Iilemperer (19a9)
and Gruenspecht (19SSa).
I examine ezport policies in a t~co-period setting ~~.here market share in one period is
important in the nezt period. There are several w.at~s to incorporate market share into
a multi-period model. First, one could examine `learning-b}.-doing' as in Baldwin and
Iírugman (1989). Dick (1991) and Gruenspecht (1988a). ~~ ith learning-by-doing curreni
market share is important because it low.ers future production costs.
.~lternatively~, one could use a switching costs model.3 In a model with sw.itching
costs, it is more costl}. for consumers (or w.holesalers) to buv from one producer in one
period and from another producer in the next. ~farket share is important to a firm when
there are sw-itching costs because after a consumer purchases from a firm, that consumer
3See Beggs ( 19R9). Beggs and lilemperer ( 1992). Farrell and Shapiro ( 1988) and Ktemperer (1987a,
198ib. 1989).
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becornes bound to that firm and thus can be subjected to higher future prices by that
firm.
In an international setting, in addition to the usual description of switching costs,'
s~ti.itching costs include transaction and information costs for import wholesalers. One
transaction cost is the cost of negotiating a contract or agreement with the supplier.
Contracting costs with a new supplier are higher than contracting costs with a familiar
supplier (e.g. it is more expensive to pay a lawyer to negotiate a new contract with a
new supplier than to renegotiate a contract based on the previous contract with the
same supplier). :~nother transaction cost is due to differences in languages and customs.
If a wholesaler has been buying steel from a Japanese firm and decides instead to buy
from a German firm then the wholesaler must hire new personnel that are familiar with
German language and customs.
In addition, there are information costs. First, there is less risk im.olved when buying
from an old supplier than when buying from a new, unfamiliar supplier. The quality
of the product, the time that it takes to ship the product etc. are all ~-ariables that are
known with reasonable certainty when dealing with a familiar supplier, whereas there is
more uncertaint}~ about these variables when dealing with an unfamiliar supplier. Other
information costs include costs incurred when making contacts within a new supplier's
organization. Sw~itching costs are an important factor in any industry in which the
product passes through a w~holesaler's hands.
A two-period trade model w~ith Hotelling consumer demand and sw.itching costs is
used to examine export policies in a setting where firms compete in prices. ~1'hen govern-
ments and firms are patient, consumers are impatient and switching costs are significant,
exporting countries will subsidize exports in the first period. A subsidy helps capture
market share which is ~aluable to the government in terms of both second period profits
and second period tax revenues.
~~'ith Cournot competition and switching costs, the obvious conjecture is that gov-
ernments will subsidize exports in both periods. Second period subsidies follow from
sub-game perfection. Go~-ernments will also employ export subsidies in the first period
4See lílemperer (198ïa. 19t~ïb, 1989).
because the}~ ~~~ill be doubly motivated to subsidize exports. The}' have the same in-
centive as in a one-period model of Cournot competition and in addition, they have an
incentive to subsidize exports to increase the domestic industry's market share.s This
conjccture along with my result, implies that optimal policy may be to subsidize exports
in earl}~ periods regardless of the nature of competition.
2 The Model
In each of hco periods, ta-o countries ~sith a single firm each export a good to a third
countr}. I follow ]ilemperer (19Sïa) closely in my implementation of switching costs. I
use this model to examine sub-game perfect, optimal export policies with price compe-
tition when both exporting countries are inten-entionist.
In each period. t- 1.2, the exporting countries simultaneously choose a tax, Ti .
Firms then simultaneously chooses price, ~. Finally consumers from the importing
countr~ purchase from one of the firms. Firms and go~-ernments ha~~e a discount factor
of tE and consumers ha~e a discount factor of 6~.
Consumers from the third country are uniformly located on the interval (0, 1~. Con-
sumers incur a transportation cost of one per unit of distance. 5ince I am examining
policies in an international setting, the 'transportation costs' can be considered, to be
partiall}~ due to product differentiation and partialh. to be actual transportation costs.
If so desired. the good can be regarded as homogeneous.
In each period. consumers have reser~-ation ~~alue r and inelasticall}~ demand one unit
of the good, produced by either firm. I also assume that after a consumer has purchased
from one supplier, it is too costly to switch to another supplier. This assumption is
made to ensure that demand curves are smooth. At the end of period 1, mass v E(0, 1~
of uniforrnlt and randoml}~ chosen consumers leave the market and are replaced b}' new
consumers. .a consumer that lea~-es the market in the second period does not incur
sIt is conceicable that the second period subsidy could be increasing in market share. If this eflect
is large enough to out-weigh both the incentive to subsidize due to strategic considerations and the
incenti~e to subsidize due to profit shifting considerations. then first period policy could be to tax
exports.
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an~. costs and gets a second period payoff of zero. The turnover rate v serves as a
substitute measure for the magnitude of switching costs - large ~~alues of v imply that
switching costs are stnall 'on a~-erage.' Consumers minimize discounted expected price
and transportation costs.
:~ single firm in each of two esporting countries produce a spatially differentiated
product. Firms ha~-e no fixed costs and ha~-e identical marginal costs which are normal-
ized to zero. Each firm j - 0. 1 is located at j. Firms maximize discounted profits. The
go~ernments of the exporting countries maximize discounted welfare, measured as the
sum of discounted home profits and discounted tax receipts.
The consumer resenation ~~alue is assumed to lie within the inter~~al [(1 tv)~(2v), (4-
c~ - v2)~(2vf I- v))~. The lower-bound is needed to ensure that the reservation value is
not binding in equilibrium. It can be shown that when reser~~ation calues are binding,
there is a multiplicit~. of equilibria. The upper-bound is required to ensure that firms
do not ha~.e an incenti~-e to deviate from the equilibrium. These bounds can be derived
using the eyuilihrium.
As is usual when sol~ing for sub-game perfect equilibria, the analysis begins with the
second period.
3 The Second Period
3.1 The Consumer's Problem
In the second period. consumers minimize their second period costs given that they are
either locked into some producer or that they are new consumers with no previous ties.
First consider the v new consumers. If new consumer i buJ.s from firm 0, i~s total cost
is firm 0's price plus i's transportation cost: pz f i. Similarly, i's cost of buying from 1 is
p2 t(1 - i). `ew consumer i will buy from 0 when the cost of bu}~ing from 0 is less than
the cost of bu~-ing from 1 and no greater than the reser~~ation ~~alue: po f i C pz f(1 - i)
and po-f-i C r. Similarl}- i but~s from 1 ifP2fi 1 p~f(1-i) and p2~(1-i) G r. Let i' be
the new consumer that is indifferent between buying from 0 and 1: i' - 1~2-~(p~-po)~2.
,~s in Iilemperer ( 19S ~ a) it must be that 1P2 - po~ G 1. For any i C i', consumer i will
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bu}- from 0 and for an}- i~ i', consumer i will bu}' from 1, hence 0 sells to mass vi' of
new- consumers and 1 sells to mass v(1 - i') of new consumers.
`ow. consider the 1- v old consumers. The marginal consumer from the first period
is located at a distance of yi from firm j. The transportation cost when bu}.ing from j
is q;. Since it is too costl} to switch, all old consumers purchase írom the same firm as
long as the price plus the transportation cost is no greater than the reservation value:
p2 -~ y~ C r. Firm j sells to mass (1 - v)~ of the old consumers.
Firm j's secund periocí cíemand is equal to the sum of the mass of the new consumers
w~ho bu} from j and the mass of the remaining old consumers who bought from j in the
first period. ~1~hen ~p2 - po~ C 1 and the marginal consumers' tota] cost is no greater
than r, firm j~s demand is:
1 1-v v
9i-~t ,~ ('~~-1)f~(Pz-~)
3.2 The Firm's Problem
(1)
Firms mazimize second period profits through choice of prices, gi~~en their market share
from the first period and gi~-en the second period taxes chosen b}~ the go~-ernments.
Firm j's second period profits are:
r~ - (F~z - Tz')y's (~)
i~sing (I) and ('?) to get firm j~s first order condition and then solving }-ields firm
reaction function.
1 1-v 1 1
Pz-.wt .w (2~-1)t2Pz~~Ti
C'omp~tting the intersection of the reaction ftmctions yields second period prices:
, 1 1 k ~ 1-v
~-1P~ - v } 3(T~ } ~T' ) } 3v (~4r )
(3)
.~n increase in countr}- j's market share necessaril}. reduces countr}- k's market share
resulting in an increase in j~s price and a decrease in k's price.
Substituting (~) into ( 1) }-ields firm j's second period output.
9'2-~f6(Tz-Ti)fl6v(~~9i-í) (5)
Substituting (-~) and (5) into (2) results in second period profits of:
s
-'-2vL1}3(T' -T~)t13v(2q;-1)J
Expressions (~). (5) and (6) ~sill be useful for future computations.
3.3 The Government's Problem
(6)
C;o~ernments choose taxes or subsidies to maximize second period domestic welfare.
('ountr}~ j's second period domestic ~~elfare is the domestic firm's profit level plus tax
re~-enues.
li'2 - (~ - Tz )9~ t T~ v~ - ~9z ( ~ )
l'sing (-1) and (5) to get countr}~ j's first order condition and then sol~-ing y-ields country
j~s reaction function.
3 1-v 1
T~ - -iv ~ ~v (~~
- 1) f 4Tz
C'omputing the intersection ~ields second period taxes.
1 1-v
T2 - - f (Zq; - 1)v jv
(3)
(9)
Substituting ( 9) into (-1). (5) and ( 6). ~~ields second period prices, quantities and profits
as a function of fir~t period market share.
'2 2(1-v)





- '?v ~1 ~ 5 (~~ - 1 )~
Taxes, prices. output and profits are all increasing in market share; this has significance
to the first period outcome.
Proposition 1 In the second period:
ij Both erporting countries set erport tares.
iiJ Tares. prices and profits are higher compared to a mode( u~ithout switching
COSÍS.
iiiJ Pnces are higher compared to a model u~ithout inten~ention.
Proof: i) It can be seen that for any v and any first period output level, taxes are
positive. ii) A model ~ti~ith no switching costs is equivalent to the case when v- 1. The
result follows since taxes, prices and profits are all decreasing in v. iii) Follows from
examination of (-1) and (10). Q.E.D.
4 The First Period
4.1 The Consumer's Problem
Consumers must decide ~ti~hich firm to purchase from, knowing how firms and governments
~~ill beha~e in the secund period and knowing that if they are still in the market in the
second period, the} are'locked-in' to whiche~er firm the}' decide to purchase from.
Consumer i's discounted expected cost of purchasing from 0 in the first period is the
first period cost plus the discounted expected second period cost: pofi fb~(1 -v)(po~-i).
Si milarl}~. i's discounted expected cost of bu}~ing from 1 is p~ -f (1-i ) f b~(1-v )(p2 f(1-i )).
Consumer i will bu~~ from 0 if i's discounted expected cost of buying from 0 is less than
~~hen bu~~ing from 1 and the first period cost is no greater than the resen-ation value.
Similarlc for when i bu~~s from 1. Let i' be the consumer that is incíifferent between
purchasing from firm 0 and from firm 1.
po~i'fbr(1-v)(Po~r-)-Pif(1-i')fbt(1-v)ÍPá~(1-t-)) (13)
Firm O~s first period output is yo - i' since for any i c i', i will bu}~ from 0 and for
ant~ i~ i'. i will buy from 1. Substituting qo for i' and ( 10) for p'.,, I sol~~e ( 13) for O~s
hrst period demand yi. Firm l~s first period demand is 1- q~ .
~ - ? f a(Pi - Pi)
~ti-here a- 5v~2(5v~-br(1 -v)(vf4)). As in I~lemperer ( 198ïa), first period demand is
more inelastic than when there are no switching costs.
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4.2 The Firm's Problem
Firms maximize discounted profits through choice of first period prices, gi~~en the go~--
ernment's choice of taxes and knowing how their first period choice will affect decisions
and profits in the future. Firm j's discounted profits are:
7f~ - A~ ~ f1E1r~ (IJ)
Substituting (12) into (1.~), the first and second order conditions for the firm's first
period problem are:
Cj-~ 1 TEf! ( ~`Eí~~ k r ~EÍt2 ) , ~
~p; -:~- v }I~- v~Pi-I~~- v p~-f-~Tl -0




~~-here P - 2,`(1 - v)~5. The second order condition holds ií FE is small enough and
6~ and v are large enough. The second order condition is not ~-er}~ restricti~-e; given
FE -.95, it holds for an~. b~ 1.1.~ and an~~ v 1 . 2.~. If the second order condition fails,
then for an~ pair of potential eyuilibrium prices, at least one firm alw-acs prefers to set
a lo~~er first period price. Therefore no pure strateg}. equilibrium exists.
Sol~ ing (161 ~ ields firm j's reaction function.
Pi - a-~ (1 -,3)Ti ~-3Pi (I~)
n.here
~ -~ ~-~s
a- ~~-rEU:' 3-~~-~~ ~
It can be seen that .3 G 1~2 and ~3 G 1;2 when v G 1. ~~'hen .3 ) 0 the reaction
function is upw~ard sloping and prices are strategic complements. howe~.er, it is possible
that 3 G 0 under some parameter conditions and hence sw~itching costs can induce prices
to be strategic substitutes! In this case, even a m}~opic government w-ould subsidize first
period exports. It ~ti~ill turn out to be the case that 3 is strictly positive for parameter
~~alues in w-hich the go~-ernment's first period second order condition is satisfied.
B~~ simplif}'ing a, it can be seen that a can be positi~~e or negative. Furthermore, the
intercept of the reaction function can be negative if either a G 0 or Tl G 0. As will
lo
be seen, this leads to the possibility of negative prices or what is commonly known as
durnping.
Sol~.ing for the intersection of the reaction functions yields first period prices as func-
tions of 7~~ and TI .
a 3 1~ k ~
( )Pr-1-3}1tr3Tr~lt~Tr
19
Substituting first period prices (19) into first period demand ( 1-1) results in first period
equilibrium output.
1 1 - .3
~-~f~lt3(T~ -Ti) (~fi)
Finall~-, substituting first period eyuilibrium output into second period tax ( 9), output
(11) and profit ~ 1?) re~ eals that:
~ 1 r 1-3 k ~ 1 ~ ~rz-2vI1fN1~:3(Tl-Ti) J -T2~
4.3 The Government's Problem
Go~ernments maximize their discounted welfare, given that the~~ kno~ti- how firms and
consumers beha~-e in the future. Countr}~ j's discounted welfare is:
li-' - ri t Ti~ f~e(r2 t T~~) - Pi4i ~~~Er2 (?~)
The first and second order conditions for country j's problem are:
Uli~~' 1 1 '~rEl~ (1 - 3)2 '~~ p2
(rll; )- (lo0v f 3Ua~(I - v)(v -~ ~) - 86E(1 - v)~)~ (~~)
The countries' second order condition holds under conditions similar to those for the
firms~ second order condition.
In a s~~mmetric eyuilibrium T~ - Tl . L'sing this and sol~~ing (23) y~ields the first period
equilibrium tax. Substituting the equilibrium tax le~el into (19) and then substituting
- 1 ~ ~ ~- - ,',a - v (1 - 3)~ } 1 f .3 ~ (~ - ~ v ) T k`'' ( )' ~
~
-~(lt3)2 ~-~~P (
1-.i) T; -0 (23)
~~~i1~~ - 200v(2bE(1 - v)~ - 25v - 56~(1 - v)(v-~ 1)) G 0
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thf~ resulting prices into (1~) }~ields first period prices and output as functions of v, b~
and FE. Finall~, first period profits can be computed.
r o zFFV ~,.i - 1 - Z[EV
Ti - a.~~t-3l - 1-J - a~ Yl 2at-rd) a~ '
~ r ~~ - a
9r - z~ r zlr-a)
lt is eas~~ to sho~~~ that this is the uniyue Pyuilibrium.
Proposition 2 In the first period:
i) Tl G 0 ij and only 7f v and br are smnll enough and bE is large enough. !J
6~ 1 bE fhcn both countries alu~ays set eiport taies. Firms charge negatit~e
prices under similar conditions.
iiJ T~ t bET2 ) 0(i.e. got~ernments satisfy an inter-temporal budget constraintJ.
iiiJ Ta.res, priccs and proftts are lou~er compared to ta2es, prices and profits in the
second per-iod.
ir) IJ v and bf are ..mall enough and bE is large enough, then tazes, prices and
profits u~i1l be lou~er compared to a modfl u~ith no su~itching costs.
rJ Profits are highcr compared to n model u~ithout interr~ention.
Proof: See appendix.
The main result of proposition 2 is that if s~citching costs are significant, consumers
are m~-opic and go~-ernments and firms are patient then go~.ernments ~ti-ill subsidize ex-
ports in the first period. In particular, governments and firms must be more patient
than consumers (bE- ~ b!). This helps to reconcile the inconsistent predictions of the
unadorned Cournot and Bertrand models w~hile also pro~~iding an explanation for why
go~~ernments suhsidize exports.
There are t~~~o effects that induce go~-ernments to subsidize exports. First, the exis-
tence of switching costs has a moderating effect on the complementarity of prices as a
strategic ~ariable (i.e. 3 G 1~2 w~hen v G 1 so that reaction functions are not as steep
~~.ith s~~~itching costs). This reduces the go~.ernment's incenti~.e to tax. Second, profits
and taz re~~enues in the second period are both increasing in market share (see (12),
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(9) and (11)). Firms ignore the effect of market share on total tax revenue when thev
mazimize profits, so in addition to aiding firms capture market share, go~-ernments ha~.e
an incentive to subsidize in order to increase their second period tax revenues. ivnder
the conditions of proposition 2, the incentive to subsidize is greater than the incentive
to tax.
.~s in Brander and Spencer, the welfare oí the exporting countries is reduced by the
use of export subsidies. This can easily be demonstrated by considering the outcome
w-hen neither countn. employs subsidies. The second petiod outcome will be the same
as when subsidies are employ-ed because it depends onlc on first period market share
(~ - 1~2 in a symmetric equilibrium). The firm's first period profit margin will afso
he tmchanged (see ezpression (19)). Since there is now no subsidy cost, each exporting
countr~ ~s welfare is increased. This pro~-ides an incentive for countries to negotiate trade
agreements which ban export subsidies.
.-1lthough a mnltiple period extention turns out to be analytically intractible, the
intuition is similar and suggests that the subsidy result should extend. For example, in
a finite horizon model, the incentice to subsidize exists in all but the last period and
hence, onl~ the last period w-ould uneyui~-ocally~ imply export taxes. In all other periods,
the switching cost moti~-e for subsidies would apply.s ~~ith infinite horizons, the last
period tax never aris-es.
It is also interesting to consider the effect counter~.ailing import duties (import taciffs
exactl}- equal to export subsidies) on the equilibrium, even though such a policy does
not maximize ~celfare in the importing country.' Since an export subsidy in conjunction
with counter~ailing import duties has no effect on equilibrium prices and profits, it acts
as a monetar~ transfer from the goi-ernment of the exporting country to the government
of importing countr~. Hence, the optimal subsidy in this case is zero.
5`ote. however. that in the periods between the first and the last, market share has alreadv been es-
tablished so that in addition to the strategic complements incentive to tax exports, there is an additional
incentive to tax in order to help the home firm exploit its market shaze. Hence, stronger conditions for
export subsidies will be required when market share has already been established.
'In fact. with no competing domestic production, countervailing duties will reduce welfaze since they
raise the price consumers pav without any benefit to the production sector.
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~.-lnother interesting result is that firms may price below cost in the first period.
Furthermore, this result does not depend on government intervention (see expression
(29) in the appendix). In many countries (the U.S. for example) this t~-pe of behavior is
considered dumping. ~~'ith switching costs, firms may choose to invest in market share
by dumping their product in the first period.
Finally, it is interesting to note that, ironically consumer surplus is im-ersely related
to the consumer discount factor. This is because a high consumer discount factor makes
first period demand more inelastic, resulting in higher first period prices.g
5 Concluding Remarks
Switching costs are shown to pro~~ide an esplanation for why the governments of many
countries subsidize some of their exports. Although such policy is indi~~idually welfare
maximizing, it is jointly ~ti~elfare reducing, providing incentive for exporting countries
to come to agreements banning ezport subsidies. Furthermore, switching costs also
pro~~ide an explanation for rational below cost pricing or in an international trade context,
rational dumping.
'(~lemperer (19bia) also pomts this out.
Elppendix
Proof of proposition 2: i) Simplif}.ing the expression for first period taxes and first
~ period prices ~ ields:
25v ~ 5bl(1 - v)(v ~- 4) - 26e(I - v)(6 - v)
Tl - 2~v
and
''(2.5Y ~.J6r( I- Y)(V ~ 4) - ëE(I - V)( I I - Y))
Pi - '?3v
T~ G 0 and countn j~s second order conditions are satisfied when 2bE(1 - v)2 G 25v f
5b1(1 - v)(v f-1) C 2FF(6 - v)(1 - v). Similarlt~ for negati~.e prices. ii) This can be seen
b}- adding 6Ew to (35). iii) Let .~ be such that 25vt5b~(v-~4)(1 -v) - 2bE(1 -v)~-~.,.
It can be seen that 0 G.~ c 25 for any~ v, b~ and bE. Taxes in the second period are





Simílarlt for prices and profits. i~~) Since taxes can be negati~~e, the~- can be lo~cer than
in a model ~cithout s~~itching costs (~cithout s~~~itching costs, go~~ernments ~cill choose
tas T{' - 1 in each period). `o~~~ consider the case ~chen 6r ? bE. Countr}~ j~s second
order condition is al~ca~-s satisfied in this case.
T, - 25v f 5br(1 - v)(v t~) - 2be( I - v)(6 - v)
i 25v
~ '~.71~ f bE( I- Y)( 1 Y~~)
- ~~JV
This holds with a strict ineyualit}- if v G 1 and 6e ~ 0. The proof for prices and profits
is similar. 5) In a non-inter~entionist world,
~ - ]ObE(1 - v)
25v









?~ comparison of the interventionist profit margin and the non-interventionist price ver-
ifies that profits are higher H~ith intervention. Q.E.D.
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